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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to explore the evolution of bargaining norms in a simple team production
problem with two sided relationship specic investments, and competition. The puzzle we wish to address
is why e¢ cient bargaining norms do not evolve even though there exist e¢ cient sequential equilibria.
Conditions under which stochastically stable bargaining conventions exist are characterized, and it is
shown that the stochastically stable division rule is independent of the long run investment strategy.
Hence, e¢ cient sequential equilibria are not in general stochastically stable, a result that may help us
understand why institutions, such as rms, may be needed to ensure e¢ cient exchange in the context of
relationship specic investments. We also nd that increasing competition, while enhancing incentives,
may also destabilize existing bargaining norms.
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1 Introduction
A starting point for modern contract theory is the Coase (1960) conjecture stating that in the absence of
transactions costs, individuals should be able to bargain to e¢ cient allocations, regardless of the original
allocation of property rights. However, when individuals make investments that are both relationship specic
and non-contractible before trade, then, as Grossman and Hart (1986) show, the allocation of property rights
can a¤ect the returns from these investments, and hence the e¢ ciency of the relationship. This observation
has led to the property rights" view of the rm, in which ownership allocation and rm boundaries are
viewed as a mechanisms that enhance productive e¢ ciency (see Hart (1995)).
This view is can be controversial. Maskin and Tirole (1999) observe that incomplete contracts and hold-
up do not preclude the existence of e¢ cient contracts. They show that regardless of the property rights
allocation, if agents have su¢ cient foresight, then there exist contracts that provide e¢ cient investment
incentives. By itself, this does not imply that agents necessarily choose e¢ cient contracts from the set of
incentive compatible contracts. Such a step typically relies upon some model of negotiation or equilibrium
selection. Both Moore (1992) and Tirole (1999) worry that e¢ cient contracts may be too complex to use
in practice, and hence to explain observed contracting arrangements one should rely upon a more realistic
model of behavior.1
One approach to this problem that has been particularly inuential in the legal academy is to use an
evolutionary model of rule or contract selection selection.2 For example Ellickson (1991) has studied the
system of property rights allocation in Shasta County, and concludes that over time individuals are likely to
evolve e¢ cient norms of behavior. Moreover, even when there is an existing ine¢ cient legal rule, individuals
are able to evolve rules that are more e¢ cient and supersede the legally enforceable rule.
In this paper we use an evolutionary learning model in the tradition of Young (1993a) and Kandori,
Mailath, and Rob (1993) to evaluate the claim that through a process of experimentation and learning
individuals select an e¢ cient division rule for a simple bilateral trade model. In this model both parties have
an opportunity to make non-contractible, relationship specic investments at a cost c before entering the
market. This investment can be thought of as human capital, such as the acquisition of special skills needed
for a project, or any other sunk investment that is made ex ante. After entering the market, agents are
randomly matched, at which point they observe each others productivity, and play a Nash demand game
to divide the gains from trade.3 An important feature of the Nash demand game is that any division of the
gains from trade is a potential Nash equilibrium, and hence the division rule selected may depend upon each
partys contribution to the productivity of the match. This ensures that whenever it is e¢ cient for both
1See discussion on page 773 of Tirole (1999).
2See Alchian (1950) for an account that is still well worth reading. Kim and Sobel (1995) make the point explicitly that even
if one allows for communication one cannot be assured that an e¢ cient allocation will be selected. They show that e¢ cient
allocations are selected in pure coordination games. When the common interest assumption fails (as in this paper), evolution
with communication has no unique equilibrium.
3The rules of the Nash demand game are as follows. Given the gains from trade S; each person makes a demand di; and if
d1 + d2  S; then they recieve their demand. Otherwise they receive zero.
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parties to invest, there exists a a division rule that is part of a sequential equilibrium that implements the
e¢ cient allocation.4
The rst issue we address is whether the existences results of Ellingsen and Robles (2002) and Troger
(2002) for one-sided specic investment extend to the case of two sided investment. They consider a model
in which only one party makes a relationship specic investment, followed by play of the Nash demand game.
They show that there is an e¢ cient stable equilibrium, with the feature that the investing party appropriates
most of the gains from trade. The authors conclude that their results demonstrate that the holdup problem
cannot be considered a stable feature of an environment with boundedly rational individuals. In particular,
their results imply that stable division rules have the feature that individuals are rewarded according to their
contribution and therefore supports equity theory. This theory, as discussed in Rabin (1998), predicts that
people feel that those who have put more e¤ort into creating resources have more claim on those resources.5
Essentially, the e¢ ciency result in a setting with one-sided investment is based upon the insight that
the allocation of all the rents to the investing party is (stochastically) stable. In particular, the additional
value added by the investment may be relatively small compared to the gains from trade, but never the
less, the stable outcome entails giving the investing party all the rents. Thus their results demonstrate that
one does not need new organizational forms, such as rms, to enhance e¢ ciency when relationship specic
investments are one-sided.
This is an interesting result because it is consistent with the evidence presented in Demsetz (1967) and
Ellickson (1991). They nd that in the cases of fur trapping and the fencing of land one observes the
evolution of e¢ cient norms of behavior. In each of these cases only one party makes an investment, and
hence their observations are consistent with the results from the one-sided investment model. The holdup
model of Grossman and Hart (1986) is quite di¤erent because it entails investments by both parties to the
contract. In the Grossman-Hart model if one allocates more bargaining power to one party, this enhances
this parties incentives to invest, while reducing the other partys investment incentives.6
Our rst result is that there exists no stable bargaining norm when two parties make observable rela-
tionship specic investments that are not contractible.7 The reason such a norm does not exist is that at
an e¢ cient equilibrium both parties make high investments, and hence there are no high-low matches in the
long run equilibrium. This implies that beliefs regarding the outcome of high-low matches can drift due to
the noise inherent in the evolutionary learning model, until eventually it is in one partys interest to enter
the market with a low investment. A similar argument applies to the low-low equilibrium.
An essential element in this argument is that the choices of individuals are subject to small noise, but
4 In a related model, Carmichael and MacLeod (2003) show that the e¢ cient allocation rule is unique when there is su¢ cient
diversity in preferences. In the subsequent discussion, when we use the term equilibrium by itself, we mean the sequential
equilibrium of the game. Similarly, the term "stable equilibrium" refers to Peyton Youngs notion of a stochastically stable
equilibrium, which we dene formally in section 4.
5As cited in Troger (2002), page 376 - the orginal source is Rabin (1998), page 18.
6Grossman and Hart (1986) state in their abstract that When residual rights are purchased by one party, they are lost by a
second party, and this inevitably creates distortions." Note that such distortions cannot arise in the case of one-sided investment
when the investing party buys the asset.
7This result is suggested in Troger (2002) discussion his model, and we rst proved it in Dawid and MacLeod (2001), a
journal this is now unfortunately out of print.
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the e¤ects of investments are completely deterministic. Arguably, in many instances the consequence of
investment is uncertain. For example, if a rm invests in worker training, there is always a chance that
some of the workers do not acquire the skill. This can be modelled by supposing there is a small probability
that a high investment results in low productivity, and conversely that a low investment may (with low
probability) result in high productivity. The level of noise associated with investment e¤ects is assumed to
be of a magnitude larger than that associated with the implementation of the individualsactions and we
derive our results when both levels approach zero. We show that this gives rise to a hierarchyof norms:
bargaining norms move very slowly, and investment norms, which, for given bargaining norms, might shift
due to stochastic changes in the investment results, move more quickly.
This, arguably small, modication of the investment game now ensures the existence of a stable bargaining
norm, regardless of the investment strategies. This bargaining norm corresponds to the equal division rule,
even when the investments by parties di¤er. Hence the equity theory discussed above is not consistent with
a stable equilibrium when both parties contribute to the gains from trade, and there is some uncertainty
regarding the link between investment and productivity. Under these conditions, our results provide a formal
justication for the use of the equal division rule in a model with holdup. This in turn implies that in many
cases the criteria of stochastic stability selects an ine¢ cient equilibrium.
The standard economic prescription to enhance e¢ ciency when norms of behavior are ine¢ cient is to
introduce more competition. We consider this possibility by supposing that if trade does not occur, the
individual may re-enter the market with their investments the next period at a discount factor of : Varying
 from 0 to 1 parameterizes the model between the case of pure holdup and perfect competition.
Initially we nd that the introduction of some competition always enhances e¢ ciency. However, as the
market becomes more competitive, this may also destabilize norm formation. When  is close to 1; an
individual with high productivity currently in a high-low matches, may prefer not to trade in order to re-
enter the market the next period, with the hope of meeting another high productivity individual. We nd
that merely the possibility of being better o¤ the next period is su¢ cient to destabilize the evolution of a
stable bargaining norm in such cases.
To see this, suppose it is an equilibrium for all individuals to make a low investment. An individual with
high productivity has a low probability of meeting a high productivity individual the next period and hence
should trade as soon as she enters the market, regardless of the productivity of her partner. But, when
high-low matches are rare, then it is possible for beliefs to drift, with the consequence that in the long run
a person with high investment eventually believes that she will meet a high type the next period. If  is
su¢ ciently large, then in this case she is better o¤ delaying trade for one period given these beliefs, which
in turn destabilizes the equilibrium norm. Thus, when  is su¢ ciently large, a stochastically stable division
norm will not exist, even though there may exist e¢ cient sequential equilibria.
This result illustrates how the introduction of learning can signicantly change the results from more
standard, game theoretic approaches. In particular, an individuals investment is an equilibrium only if
it provides a higher payo¤ than she would receive choosing the alternative investment level. To be an
equilibrium all that is required is that it is possible to select some o¤ equilibrium beliefs that are self-
enforcing. In contrast, in an evolutionary model all strategies are chosen with some probability. The
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distinguishing features of o¤ equilibrium strategies is that in the limit they are chosen very infrequently.
This implies that beliefs are not xed, but can drift over time. As a result, equilibrium strategies must
satisfy the more stringent criteria of being an equilibrium, regardless of the o¤ equilibrium beliefs. This has
a number of practical implications.
The rst of these is that a necessary condition for the existence of a norm is that it is used in practice.
Secondly, as a market becomes more competitive, then the frequency of ine¢ cient matches is reduced. Hence,
if a fair division norms applies mainly in cases where trade is ine¢ cient, then increases in competition will
lead to a breakdown of norms of fair behavior. This observation appears to be consistent with the breakdown
in norms of fair behavior that seem to accompany the transition process (see for example Roland (2000)).
The agenda of the paper is as follows. The next section introduces the basic model. It is shown that
whenever high investment is e¢ cient, there is a sequential equilibrium implementing the e¢ cient allocation.
Sections 3 introduces the formal stochastic learning model that is used to dene the notion of stochastically
stable states and the induced stable norms. This is followed by a discussion of how adding two sided
investment to the model results in the non-existence of a stable equilibrium. A preliminary analysis of the
stable equilibrium for our model is carried out in section 6. Section 7 considers the case of substitutes, where
the marginal return from the rst investment is greater than the second investment, while section 8 presents
our results for complementary investments. Section 9 discusses the impact of the outside option, and nally,
section 10 contains our concluding discussion.
2 The Model
We are interested in the kind of bargaining and investment norms which are developed endogenously in a
population of adaptive agents. To examine this, we use an evolutionary bargaining model similar to Young
(1993b) and Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) as extended to incorporate investment by Troger (2002)
and Ellingsen and Robles (2002). The basic idea underlying this approach is that individuals anonymously
interact in a population and use a random sample of observed past behavior to build beliefs about current
actions of their opponent. With a large probability they then choose the optimal strategy given their beliefs.
Consider a single population of identical agents who are repeatedly matched randomly in pairs to engage
in joint production (or in a joint project). Every agent can make an investment that inuences his type,
either high (H) or low (L), before entering the population, and accordingly the joint surplus of the project.
Before partners start joint production or trade they bargain over the allocation of the joint surplus. If
the bargaining does not lead to an agreement they split without carrying out the project and look for new
partners. The e¤ect of an investment stays intact as long as the agent has not carried out the project. It
is however assumed that an agent leaves the population once she has carried out the project and that the
investment afterwards creates no additional revenue. Looking for a new partner for the project needs time
and therefore payo¤s from the next matching are discounted by a factor  2 [0; ]. The more specic the
project, the search time is longer and hence  is smaller. Hence, we interpret  as a parameter measuring
the project specicity, though it can be induced by any type of market frictions leading to search times.
The value of trade t periods after the initial investment is tU; where U is the agents share of the gains
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from trade. When  = 0 the investment can only generate revenues in the current period and the model
corresponds to one with purely relationship specic investment.
The sequence of decisions facing an individual are:
1. The agent, i, decides about her investment level Ii 2 fh; lg ; where the cost of investment is
c (I) =
(
c; if I = h;
0; if I = l.
After the investment has been made the type Ti 2 fH;Lg of the agent is determined. It is assumed
that the probability of being a high type after having invested I is pI ; where ph > pl.
2. The agent is randomly matched with some partner and both observe each others type. The types
determine the size of the surplus, STiTj , where when convenient SH  SHH ; SA  SHL = SLH and
SL  SLL; and satises SH  SA  SL > 0.
3. Individual i makes a demand conditional upon her type and that of her partner j, denoted by xTiTj 2
XTiTj (k) =

0; TiTj ; 2TiTj ; :::; kTiTj
	
; TiTj = STiTj=k; k is some large even number.
4. The payo¤ to individual i in this period is given by the rules of the Nash demand game:
U i =
(
xiTiTj ; if x
i
TiTj
+ xjTjTi  SIiIj






and similarly for player j. Agents are assumed to be risk neutral.
5. If agent i has traded in this period she leaves the population and is replaced by another individual.
If there was no trade the individual stays in the population and goes again through steps 2 - 5 in the
following period where future payo¤s are discounted by a factor  per period.
Throughout the analysis SH and SL are assumed xed, while the degree of complementarity in investment,
SA, the cost of investment, c, and the discount rate  are parameters that determine the nature of the
investment problem.
Furthermore, we assume that the probability that the type di¤ers from the investment level is symmetric
and small, namely: 1 ph = pl =  for some small positive . This latter assumption plays an important role
in the analysis because it ensures that even if all individuals carry out high investment, there is a strictly
positive probability of having low types in the population. Hence each period there is the potential for
trade between H and L types. As we shall see, the existence of such trades is a necessary condition for the
evolution of a bargaining norm.
This is a one-population model where the only di¤erence between individuals stems from their investment.
Accordingly, in any uniform equilibrium where all individuals use identical strategies, the surplus has to be
split equally in matches of partners with identical investments. We are concerned with the evolution of norms
which are uniform equilibria, and hence in any norm the surplus has to be split equally between partners
6
with identical investment8 . Therefore, to simplify the analysis it is assumed here that when two high types







Although this has to hold true in any norm, our assumption is not completely innocent. In the absence of
such an assumption we may also have cyclical long-run phenomena where all individuals keep switching in a
coordinated fashion between demanding more or less than half of the surplus in equal investment matchings.
This would result in disagreement for half of the periods and a waste of parts of the surplus for the other half.
Ruling out such phenomena makes the model much more tractable and allows us to focus on the question
we are mainly interested in, namely the allocation of surplus in matches between partners with di¤erent
productivities and its implication for investment incentives.
For most of the current analysis it shall be assumed that the discount factor  is su¢ ciently small that
it is always e¢ cient to trade, regardless of the type of your partner, rather than wait. Hence the option to
wait will act as a constraint on the current trade, an assumption that is discussed in more detail in the next
section.
These assumptions greatly simplify the strategy space. When a player rst enters the game she chooses
I 2 fh; lg, after which point she learns her type T 2 fH;Lg : Given her type, each period she needs to
formulate only her demand when faced with a partner of a di¤erent type, since she adopts the equal split
rule when faced with a partner of the same type. Formally, a strategy of the stage game is given by
(I; xHL; xLH) 2 fh; lg  X(k)2, where X (k) = XLH (k) = XHL (k), but in every period, other then the
period she enters, an agent only has to determine one action, namely xHL if she is of type H; or xLH if she
is of type L. For convenience let xH = xHL; denote the strategy of the high type when paired with a low
type, while xL = xLH is the strategy of a low type when paired with a high type. In what follows we will
refer to the pair (xH ; xL) as the bargaining strategy of an agent.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
Our goal is to understand the structure of the stochastically stable equilibria as a function of the cost of
investment, c; the degree of investment complementarity, SA; and the degree of investment specicity, .
The purpose of this section is to characterize the uniform sequential equilibria in stationary strategies of the
population game that result in high investment.9 It will turn out that if stochastically stable equilibria exist
they are indeed in this class of equilibria.
Note that in the Nash demand game any strategy prole (xH ; xL) such that xL + xH = SA is a Nash
equilibrium. By a bargaining norm we mean a situation where all individuals have identical bargaining
strategies of the form (SA   x^L; x^L) for some x^L 2 [0; SA].
Given our assumption that surplus is split equally between equal types if trade occurs, we only have to be
concerned about the question whether equal types want to trade or wait for a di¤erent type. The maximal
8Young (1993b) has shown in a two population model that the equal split is stochastically stable when both populations have
identical characteristics. In his model contrary to ours there exist however conventions where the surplus is not split equally
between the partners from the two populations although they have identical characteristics.
9This means that we consider scenarios where all individuals use identical strategies of the stage game every period and
these strategies are constant over time.
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payo¤ a low type can get in the next period is SA and therefore SL2 > SA is su¢ cient to guarantee trade
between low types. For high types we must have SH2 > SA which clearly is a weaker condition. Hence we





Observe that in High-Low pairings with relatively high discount factors and strong complementarity
between investments, then even if a bargaining norm exists, one of the two partners would rather wait for a
partner of identical type than to trade according to the bargaining norm. For a given bargaining norm x^L,
the high type in a High-Low pairing expects a low bid of x^L, the low type expects a high bid of SA   x^L. If
both partners believe that they will meet an identical type in the following period, they are willing to trade
if
SA   x^L > SH=2;
x^L > SL=2:
The rst condition ensures that the high type prefers trading with a low type, rather than waiting one
period and trading with a high type. The second condition is the corresponding requirement for the low






Put di¤erently, (2) implies that there exists a bargaining norm xL such that individuals always trade in
High-Low matchings regardless of their beliefs concerning the distribution of types in the population. Notice
that condition (2) can not be binding, if investments are substitutes. Investments are substitutes if the
marginal return from the rst investment is greater than from the second investment:




Conversely, investments are complements if the marginal return from the second investment is larger:




In this case, when  is large it may be more e¢ cient for HL pairs not to trade, and instead to delay trade
until they meet a partner of the same type. For further reference, the requirement that there is a bargaining
norm that implies trade in HL pairings regardless of the individual beliefs about the type distribution is
summarized as the trade condition:
Denition 1 The discount rate  satises the trade condition if  < 2SASL+SH :
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It shall be shown below that this is a necessary condition for the existence of a stochastically stable
bargaining norm when investments are complements. By a norm we mean a pair fI; x^Lg ; with the interpre-
tation that each agent selects the investment I upon entering the market, the low type demands x^L , while
the high type demands x^H = SA   x^L: To economize on writing out the full set of strategies and payo¤s,
the notion of a self-enforcing norm is be dened as follows.
Denition 2 A norm fH; x^Lg is self-enforcing if:
1. (1  ) (SH=2  x^L) + 
 
(SA   x^L)  SL2
  c= (1  2) ;
2. SA   x^L   (1 )(1 )SH=2
3. x^L   (1 (1 ))SL=2:
The rst of the three conditions says that for the given bargaining norm, x^L; the expected payo¤ of
high investment exceeds that of low investment. The expected payo¤ of a person making a high investment
assuming that trade is immediate and she meets a high type is (1  )SH=2 + x^L; while the result of no
investment is SH=2+(1  ) x^L: If she meets a low type, the expected payo¤s are (1 )(SA  x^L)+SL=2
if she invests high and (SA  x^L) + (1  )SL=2 if she invests low. Given the expected equilibrium fraction
of high types in the market in any period is (1   ) a simple calculation yields condition 1. The second
condition is the requirement that a person who is a high type prefers to trade with a low type, rather than
wait until meeting a high type. The nal condition requires the low type to prefer trading with a high
type, rather then waiting until meeting a low type. This places a lower bound on x^L: It is a straightforward
exercise to show that for every self-enforcing norm there is a sequential equilibrium yielding this outcome for
the trading game outlined above. A self-enforcing norm, fL; x^Lg ; for low investment is dened in a similar
fashion.
For much of the analysis the parameter  is positive, but small. In the limit when  = 0, a su¢ cient
condition for the existence of a self-enforcing norm with high investment is that it is e¢ cient.
Proposition 1 Assume that the trade condition is satised and that it is strictly e¢ cient for all agents to
select high investment, SH   2c > max fSA   c; SLg. If  is su¢ ciently small then there exists a bargaining
norm, x^L; such that fH; x^Lg is a self-enforcing norm.
This result demonstrates that when noise is small it is possible to support as an equilibrium high invest-
ment whenever it is e¢ cient to do so. It should be noted that we always also have self-enforcing norm with
low investment10 , e.g. fL; SAg is always self-enforcing. In contrast, the literature on the holdup problem
assumes that the ex post division of the surplus is determined by the Nash bargaining solution, which in
some cases induces ine¢ cient investment. However the division implied by the Nash bargaining solution is
only one among many sequential equilibria of the game. In general, one is able to conclude that for this game
there are a large number of sequential equilibria, some of which induce e¢ cient investment. The question
then is whether or not the e¢ cient equilibria are (stochastically) stable.
10The denition of a self-enforcing norm with high investment has to be adopted in the obvious way.
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4 Learning Dynamics
Consider now the kind of bargaining and investment norms that are developed endogenously in a population
of adaptive agents. Following Young (1993a) and Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) it is assumed that
agents sample past trades to build an empirical distribution of the investment and bargaining choices of
the other individuals in the population (see Young (1993b) for the application of this approach to the Nash
bargaining game). Regarding the value of the outside option, agents believe that the distribution of low
and high types in the economy is time stationary, a hypothesis that is consistent with the assumption that
agents base current actions on past observations of the frequency of high types. It is also assumed that with
a small probability they make mistakes in executing their optimal strategy given their beliefs regarding the
play of the game described in section 2.
Our model consists of a single population of individuals who choose investment from fh; lg upon entering
the population and afterwards have to choose their action from the space X (k) every period until they
trade and leave the population. This choice is based on beliefs about distribution of types and bargaining
behavior of the other individuals in the population. Each period every individual independently takes a
random sample of m individuals from the previous period, observing the type and the demand made at
the bargaining stage. This sample is added to the memory of the individual thereby replacing some old
observations11 .
Using the data in her memory each individual generates beliefs about the fraction of types H in the
population and the distribution of demands made by other individuals in HL and LH pairings. Each of
these beliefs is based on m observations, hence there is a nite set of possible beliefs we denote by B. For
each b 2 B we denote by p^ (b) the estimated proportion of high types, by F^H (xH ; b) the estimated probability
that xH or less is demanded by a high type in a HL pairing and by F^L(xL; b) the estimated probability that
xL or less is demanded by a low type in a LH pairing. Put di¤erently, F^H and F^L are empirical distribution
functions given the observations in the memory of the individual. It will turn out to be convenient to denote
by P(z) the distribution function of point expectations z, i.e. P(z)(x) = 0 for x < z and P (z)(x) = 1 for
x  z. When an agent leaves the market, her beliefs are passed on to the new agent entering the market to
replace this agent. Beliefs in the rst period are arbitrary.
The structure and time-line of the game with adaptive dynamics is summarized as follows (see also
Appendix A):
(i) At the beginning of the game beliefs are random, but when an individual leaves she is replaced by
another agent with the same beliefs, say b.
(ii) Investment decisions are only made by agents entering the population in the current period. Given
her beliefs, an agent chooses to invest if the expected gain from investment exceeds investment costs c
under the assumption of optimal behavior on the bargaining stage. Then she draws her type, which is
equal to her investment with probability 1  :
11An exact mathematical description of the belief formation and learning dynamics considered as well as the associated belief
and state spaces is given in Appendix A
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(iii) Each period the following steps are repeated until exit occurs:
1. At the beginning of every period t the individual randomly samples the types of m individuals
from the previous period. This is used to update beliefs bit 2 B.
2. With probability " > 0 the individual selects an action randomly from X (k) ; under the uniform
distribution. This noise process is i:i:d: between individuals and periods. With probability 1  "
the individual determines which demand maximizes the expected payo¤ under her beliefs if she
is matched with a di¤erent type.
3. Agents are randomly paired, and their payo¤s are determined. If the partners are of identical
type, there is an equal split, otherwise they chose the actions determined at stage 2:
4. If trade occurs, both agents leave and are replaced with agents with the same beliefs who begin
at step (ii). If not, step (iii) is restarted.
Given that an agents action is completely determined by her beliefs bit 2 B; and type T i 2 fH;Lg12 , the
state at time t is characterized by a distribution over beliefs and types, and accordingly there is a nite state
space we call S. The learning process described above denes a time homogeneous Markov process ftg1t=0
on the state space S. Although, even for  > 0, the transition matrix is not positive, the following lemma
shows that the process is irreducible and aperiodic.
Lemma 1 For  > 0 the Markov process ftg1t=0 as dened above is irreducible and aperiodic.
Hence, for  > 0 there exists a unique limit distribution () over S, where s() denotes the probability
of state s. Following a standard approach in evolutionary game theory we consider the limit distribution
for small values of  and in particular characterize the states whose weight in the limit distribution stays
positive as the mutation probability  goes to 0. Such states are called stochastically stable:
Denition 3 A state s 2 S is called stochastically stable if lim!0 s() > 0. We say that a set is stochas-
tically stable if all his elements are stochastically stable.
The reason why this concept is of interest is that for small  the process spends almost all the time in
stochastically stable sets. Hence, characterizing the stochastically stable outcome means characterizing the
long run properties of the evolutionary process. To identify stochastically stable states it is necessary to rst
identify the minimal absorbing sets of the process for  = 0. It is well known that the set of stochastically
stable states is a subset of the union of these so called limit sets. Formally, a limit set is dened as follows:
Denition 4 A set 
  S is called a limit set of the process if for  = 0 the following statements hold:
8s 2 
 IP(t+1 2 
jt = s) = 1
8s; ~s 2 
 9z > 0 s.t. IP(t+z = ~sjt = s) > 0:
12We look at the process after all incoming agents have made their investment decisions, but before they are paired and
therefore the type of all agents is determined.
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In the following sections we will characterize the stochastically stable sets and discuss the implied invest-
ment and bargaining norms.
The question we address is the emergence of a unique, e¢ cient and stable bargaining norm in which all
individuals follow the same investment strategy, and have the same expectations regarding how to divide
the gains from trade. This is formally dened by:
Denition 5 A state s induces the bargaining norm xL if all individuals have beliefs b 2 B that place
probability one on the demand by their partner being xL or SA   xL; depending upon their type in HL
matches.13 If all stochastically stable states induce the same bargaining norm we say that this bargaining
norm is stable.
Conversely, a bargaining norm does not exist at a state s if there is heterogeneity in the beliefs of the
agents regarding the terms of trade between high and low types. Observe that the notion of a norm used
here captures its dual nature. As Ellickson (1991) observes (see chapter 7), a norm denes what is considered
acceptable behavior by individuals, and hence explicitly implies homogeneity of behavior. It is also used to
trigger punishments against deviators. In this model, the punishment is generated by the cost of disagreement
when a party deviates from the accepted fair division norm.
5 Deterministic Investment E¤ects
Before we explore the stable norms of the model described above we discuss briey the importance of our
assumption that investment e¤ects are stochastic ( > 0) for the evolution of bargaining norms. This is
particularly important since the results of Ellingsen and Robles (2002) and Troger (2002) show that in cases
of one-sided investment the stable bargaining norm always induces e¢ cient investment when  = 014 .
Dawid and MacLeod (2001) study the two-sided investment model presented for the case  =  = 0. Their
ndings concerning the evolution of bargaining norms can be summarized as follows (compare Proposition
4 and Proposition 7 in Dawid and MacLeod (2001)):
Proposition 2 With deterministic investment ( = 0) and relationship specic investments ( = 0) the
stochastically stable set always includes states where individuals have heterogenous beliefs about bargaining
behavior. Hence, there is no stable bargaining norm.
The assumption that  = 0 is not crucial for this nding and the result would still hold for  > 0.
Intuitively, once all individuals follow the same investment strategy, any bargaining norm which might exist
at that point will be slowly destroyed. Under identical investment strategies with deterministic investment,
the only way a pairing between a high and a low type might occur is that at least one of the two has mutated.
A mutant may not follow the bargaining norm and hence at least half of the demands in high low pairings
are completely random and do not follow any bargaining norm. Since all individuals use these demands to
update their beliefs, any uniform consistent point beliefs that might have existed in the population will be
13Formally F^H(b) = P(SA   xL), and F^L(b) = P(xL)).
14Also, they only consider the case of relationship specic investments ( = 0).
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destroyed, and beliefs about bargaining behavior between high and low types keeps drifting around in the
space of possible beliefs. Therefore, stable bargaining norms between high and low types cannot evolve with
deterministic investment.
This drift of beliefs is also present in the scenario with one-sided investment and eventually leads to an
outcome where investors who invest e¢ ciently get a su¢ ciently large part of the surplus that they have no
incentive to change investment regardless of their beliefs about the allocation of surplus for other investment
levels. In the case of two-sided investments one of the two partners will always have incentives to change
her investment level if she believes that such a change increases her fraction of the surplus by a su¢ cient
amount. Therefore, for the case of two sided deterministic investments there are no stable bargaining norms,
and consequently investment levels are in general ine¢ cient.
6 Existence of Stable Bargaining Norms and Induced Investment
The ndings reported in the previous section suggest that the uncertainty of investment e¤ects should have
an important positive role for the evolution of stable bargaining norms. For  > 0 high-low matches occur
with positive probability even after an investment norm has been established and therefore the drift of beliefs
which is responsible for the continuous destruction of norms in the deterministic case cannot occur. In this
section we return to the case  > 0 and nd conditions under which we always get stable bargaining norms.
A necessary condition for the evolution of a norm is that the terms of trade between high and low types
result in outcomes that are better than their respective outside options. By simply waiting for a partner
with the same type an agent can guarantee a non-negative expected payo¤, where the size of the expected
payo¤ depends on the agentsbeliefs about the distribution of types and the value of . Since    the
population distribution of types keeps uctuating even if a bargaining norm has been reached. Accordingly,
a bargaining norm x^L can only be stable, if  in the absence of mutations  all individuals who expect
demands x^L (SA   x^L) from their opponents in high-low (low-high) pairings, stick to this norm regardless
of their belief p^ about the type distribution. In particular, a bargaining norm can only be stable if both
partners prefer the payo¤ according to this norm to the outside option for all possible beliefs p^i. Proposition
3 shows that the trade condition is a necessary condition for this to hold true15 .
Proposition 3 Suppose that the trade condition does not hold, then for su¢ ciently large m, n, and k there
is a unique stochastically stable set L where beliefs about demands as well as induced actual demands do not
coincide for all individuals in all states contained in L. Accordingly, no stable bargaining norms exist.
If the trade condition does not hold, bids never settle down at a compatible norm, rather persistent
uctuations driven by the uctuations in the p^i occur. Long run bargaining behavior is then characterized
by ergodic behavior on a set of di¤erent bids. When investments are complements, there is a  < 1; such
that for all  >  the trade condition is not satised. This demonstrates that if the market is su¢ ciently
competitive and investments are complements, then it is not possible for a bargaining norm to evolve. This
does not imply that increasing market competition results in ine¢ ciency. When the trade condition does not
15We will establish below that the trade condition is also su¢ cient for the existence of a stable bargaining norm.
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hold, then LL and HH matches are the most likely trades, and hence if high investment is strictly e¢ cient,
(SH=2  c > SL=2) individuals often nd it in their interests to invest.
The question now concerns the nature of the division rule when it is e¢ cient for HL pairs to trade, and
therefore the remainder of the paper assumes that the trade condition is satised. Under this assumption
long run norms might exist. Clearly the investment incentives depend on which of these norms are reached in
the long run. Due to our assumption of stochastic investment e¤ects, the actual distribution of productivity
types will keep uctuating even after bargaining behavior has settled down at a norm. On the other hand,
transitions between bargaining norms have to be triggered by (in general multiple simultaneous) mutations.
Hence, for small mutation probabilities bargaining norms adjust more slowly, and are more stable than the
realized distribution of types. As we will see, this implies that the stable bargaining norm is independent of
the long run investment behavior and therefore also independent of investment costs c.
For a given bargaining norm and current distribution of types the distribution of types in the following
period depends on the outcome of the stochastic sampling procedure for all agents. Sampling generates
the beliefs p^(bit) and therefore inuences the investment decisions, and the actual realization of types given
the investment decision. This can be described by a Markov process f~tg1t=0 on the state space ~S =
f0; 1=n; 2=n; : : : ; 1g. For  > 0 the process is irreducible and aperiodic. The unique limit distribution is
denoted by ~(). The following lemma shows that three scenarios are possible as  becomes small.
Lemma 2 For a given bargaining norm x^L; the long run distribution of types for small  can be characterized
by one of the following16 :
(a) lim!0 ~0() = 1.
(b) lim!0 ~1() = 1.
(c) lim!0 ~1() = lim!0 ~

0() = 0:5.
In case (a) we say that x^L induces a no-investment norm, in (b) x^L induces a full investment norm, and
in case (c) we say that x^L induces cyclical investment. By cyclical investment we mean that in one period
everybody invests, and in the next period nobody invests. When all individuals invest, it is optimal not to
invest, and vice verso. The hierarchy of conventions should be noted here. When dening stable bargaining
conventions we have considered the dynamics for  ! 0 keeping  > 0. We then take the limit  ! 0 to
derive the long-run equilibrium.
Accordingly, in the following analysis we will on the one hand characterize the stable bargaining norm
(for  > 0;  ! 0) for di¤erent constellations of SA and c and then the investment norm induced by the
stable bargaining norm (for ! 0; ! 0;  ). Our discussion starts with the case where investments of
the two parties are complements.
16We exclude the non-generic cases where both ~ = 0 and ~ = 1 are absorbing states for  = 0 and have identical radius.
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7 The Case of Substitutes
The trade condition always holds if investments are substitutes, which implies that there is a chance for
stable bargaining norms. Proposition 4 shows that stable bargaining norms indeed exist in this setting and
characterizes how the generated norm depends on the degree of substitutability of investments. We say
that investments are weak substitutes if 12 (SH + SL)  SA  S := SH   2 (SH   SL). For S < SA  SH
investments are called strong substitutes.
Proposition 4 For su¢ ciently large m, n the limit of the stochastically stable sets of the process ftg for
k !1 can be characterized as follows:





2(2  ) (SA   SL):







Note that in the absence of outside options ( = 0) the equal split rule is the unique, stable bargaining
norm, regardless of investment levels. For positive  the stable norm allocates less than half of the joint
surplus to the low type.
In order to characterize the investment norms induced by the stable bargaining norm we rst observe
that investment incentives are largest for p^ = 0 and smallest for p^ = 1 if investments are substitutes. Hence
three possible scenarios arise: the stable bargaining norm is such that a) low investment is optimal for all
p^, b) high investment is optimal for all p^, or, c) high investment is optimal for p^ = 0 but low investment
is optimal for p^ = 1. In the following proposition we show that an investment norm is induced in the rst
case, a no-investment norm in the second case and cyclical investment in the third case. Furthermore, we
characterize the range of investment costs c where each of the three scenarios arises.
Proposition 5 Assume that m;n and k are su¢ ciently large.
(a) If investments are weak substitutes the stable bargaining norm induces full-investment for c < c1, no-
investment for c > c2 and cyclical investment for c 2 [c1; c2], where
c1 = 12(2 ) ((SA   SL) + (2  )(SH   SA))
c2 = 12  (SA   SL):
(b) If investments are strong substitutes the stable bargaining norm induces full-investment for c < c3 and




((SH   SL) + 2(SH   SA)):
For  = 0, investments can never be strong substitutes and c1 = (SH   SA) =2; c2 = (SA   SL)=2.
It is e¢ cient for both parties to invest whenever c < (SH   SA) : Therefore, regardless of SA we obtain
15
under-investment for some values of c. As  increases both c1 and c2 move up. Furthermore, for positive
 there is always a range of SA where investments are strong substitutes. The transition from weak to
strong substitutes is exactly at the point where the threshold c1 crosses the border of the area where high
investment is e¢ cient.
Figures 1 illustrates the relationship between (SA; c) and the investment norms when the discount rate is
0: The gure illustrates both the cases of substitutes and complements (discussed below). It is assumed that
SH = 2SL; with the illustrated trapezoid region giving all the fSA; cg combinations for which full investment
is e¢ cient. Holdup occurs in the region above the line(s) C1 and C4. For these values high investment is
e¢ cient but not induced by the stable bargaining norm. Notice that when investments are substitutes then
in the region between the lines C1 and C2 investments cycles between high and low.
       Figure 1 Here      
Figure 2 illustrates the e¤ect of increasing competition by setting the discount factor  = 1=4: Observe
that this results in an upward shift of C1 and C2. In addition this results in a decrease in S from SH and
hence there is now a region corresponding to strong substitutes. In that case observe that when SA > S;
and costs satisfy c > SH   SA; but are below line C3; then the stochastically stable equilibrium may entail
high investment, even though this is not e¢ cient.
       Figure 2 Here      
More generally, in the case of weak substitutes the gain from investing at the bargaining norm is:




2 (2  ) (SA   SL) ;
 (SH   SA)
2
:
Therefore, the outside option increases the gains from investing, regardless of whether it is binding at the
equilibrium. However, for weak substitutes, it never increases incentives to the point that the gains from
investing are equal to the full marginal gains, given by (SH   SA) : On the other hand, if investments are
strong substitutes and the gains from the second investment are very small (case (b) above) the stable norm
indeed induces full investment whenever this is e¢ cient. These observations can be summarized in the
following corollary.
Corollary 1 If investments are strong substitutes the stable bargaining norm induces full-investment for all
values of c where full investment is e¢ cient. In some cases, it may entail over-investment.
8 The Case of Complements
Consider now the case of complementary investments, where (SH + SL) =2  SA  SL: According to propo-
sition 3 no norms evolve if the trade condition is violated. Therefore, we assume throughout this section
that the trade condition holds.
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The following proposition shows that under this condition there is a unique stable bargaining norm
which is again independent of beliefs regarding the fraction of high types in the market. The properties of
this bargaining norm depend on the degree of complementarity of investments. We call investments weak
complements if (SH + SL) =2  SA  S := 2 ((2  )SH + SL), and strong complements if S > SA  SL.
Proposition 6 Suppose the trade condition holds, then for su¢ ciently large m, n the limit of the stochas-
tically stable sets of the process ftg for k !1 can be characterized as follows:
(a) If investments are strong complements the stable bargaining norm is









2(2  ) (SA   SL):
Case (a) occurs when the outside option for the high type is binding for p^ = 1. This can only happen if




One can explore the maximum incentives possible, while ensuring the existence of a bargaining norm by












SH + SA > SA;
and hence we are in the case of strong complements, and the stable bargaining norm is given by:








This result illustrates the e¤ect that the low payo¤ plays in determining the bargaining norm. When
SL is close to zero (the payo¤ in the absence of trade), then with su¢ cient competition one obtains rst
best incentives, while ensuring the existence of a bargaining norm. When  = 2SASL+SH and c < SA; then low
investment is not an equilibrium for SL = 0; and we have high investment in this case. However, in other
cases, both high and low investment choices may be equilibria under the stable bargaining norm.
Taking the bargaining norm as xed, investment decisions have the structure of a coordination game
when investments are complements. Incentives are larger for p^ = 1 than for p^ = 0. This implies that
if the bargaining norm induces no investment for p^ = 1, no individual will invest any more, once the
bargaining norm has been established regardless of their beliefs p^ a no-investment norm is induced. On
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the other hand, if investment is optimal at p^ = 0, everyone invests under the stable bargaining norm a
full investment norm is induced. If investment is optimal for p^ = 1 and no investment is optimal for p^ = 0,
both the homogeneous state corresponding to full investment and the homogeneous state corresponding to
no investment are absorbing as long as high investment always implies high types and low investment always
implies low types. Standard results about stochastic stability of equilibria in coordination games (Kandori,
Mailath, and Rob (1993)) imply that also in such a scenario either investment or no-investment is induced.
The selection depends on how large the maximal sampled fraction of deviating productivity types can be
such that investment (respectively no-investment) is still optimal. Taking into account proposition 6 these
considerations yield:
Proposition 7 Assume that m;n and k are su¢ ciently large, the trade condition holds, and investments
are complements, then the stable bargaining norm induces full investment if c < c4(SA; ) and no-investment
for c > c4(SA; ), where
(3) c4(SA; ) =
(
1
4 (SH   SL) + 12 (SH   SA) if SA  S;
1
4 (SH   SL) + 2(2 ) (SA   SL) if SA > S:
In the case of investment complements high investment is e¢ cient (for su¢ ciently small ) whenever
c < (SH   SL)=2; but is only induced by the stable norm for c < c4 < (SH   SL)=2: If investments are
complements there always remains a hold-up region with ine¢ cient investments in the long run (see gures
1 and 2). It follows from the coordination game structure of the investment stage that a bargaining norm x^L
does not necessarily induce a high investment norm even if fH; x^Lg is a self-enforcing norm. An implication
of this, especially when compared to the case of substitutes, is that the set of parameters for which a full
investment norm is self-enforcing under the equal split rule might be larger than the set of parameter values
for which high investment is part of a stochastically stable equilibrium. To see this, notice that if SA > SH
and c < 12 (SH   SA) the norm fH;SA=2g is self-enforcing for su¢ ciently small . Comparing this bound




SL + 2(1  )SH ; (2  )SH + (2 + )SL)
4

we have c4(SA; ) < (SH   SA)=2. If c 2
 






is a self-enforcing norm
for su¢ ciently small , but there is no stable norm with full investment.
The fact that there is a self-enforcing norm with high investment does not imply uniqueness of the
equilibrium. Even if a high investment norm is self-enforcing there might be a coexisting low investment
equilibrium with the corresponding equilibrium selection problem. To deal with the equilibrium selection
problem we could use the concept of risk dominance as an equilibrium selection device and say that a
bargaining norm induces high investment only if the full investment is the risk dominant equilibrium at the
investment stage17 . It is straightforward to check then that the maximal investment costs inducing high
17The use of risk dominance as the selection criterium is appropriate because it is well known that the risk dominant
equilibrium coincides with the stochastically stable one in coordination games.
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investment under the equal split rule is always below c4. So, taking into account the coordination problems
arising at the investment stage, the equal split rule again provides less investment incentives than the stable
norm.
9 The Impact of the Outside Option
Considering propositions 4 and 6, the e¤ect of the outside options on the bargaining norm might be quite
surprising. Notice, that in this model the outside option is introduced only as a constraint on the set of
possible bargaining agreements and is binding only in case a) of proposition 6. Hence, one might expect
the outside option principle to apply (see Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986)). In that case if
xL > SL=2 and SA   xL > SH=2; then xL should not depend on either SH or SL; yet we nd that that
for all  > 0 the stable bargaining norm depends upon at least one of the outside options, and that the low
types share is always strictly increasing in SL; a result that is consistent with Binmore, Proulx, Samuelson,
and Swierzbinski (1995) who report results from a bargaining game with drift. This might raise the question
whether the e¢ ciency result of corollary 1 is a simple implication of the di¤erence in threat point payo¤s of
the two types.
To address this question let us denote by x^NL the allocation consistent with the Nash bargaining solution
between a high and a low type where both have beliefs p^ = 1 (they believe that they will meet a high type
with probability 1 next period) and the expected payo¤s in the following period are treated as a threat point.
















  (SH   SA)
2(2  ) :
For  = 0 the Nash bargaining solution, just like the stable norm, coincides with the equal split rule.
Comparing (4) with the stable bargaining norms from propositions 4 and 6, shows that for  > 0 we have
x^NL > x
S




A in the case of complements. Figure 3 shows the
stable bargaining norm x^sL (solid line) and the Nash bargaining solution (dashed line) as a function of SA
for  = 1=4. The equal split rule gives an outcome that is everywhere above both of these rules, and hence
the addition of an outside option unambiguously increases investment incentives.
 Figure 3 Goes Here  
When investments are substitutes the investment incentives in a population of investors under the stable
bargaining norm are not only larger than under the equal split rule, but are also larger than under Nash
bargaining with the outside options as threat points. On the other hand, when investments are complements
the Nash bargaining solution with the outside option as threat point gives a smaller allocation of the surplus
to low types compared to the stable norm, and therefore provides higher investment incentives.
19
To understand this result intuitively observe that the long run stability of the bargaining norms are
determined by their resistance to change in scenarios where deviations from the norm have the highest
chance of altering the norm. Bargaining norms are more easily destabilized in scenarios with low investment
in the population since the expected losses from disagreement when not giving in to demands of deviators
from the norm are the largest under this investment pattern. When investments are substitutes, a high
type has a lot of bargaining power in an environment of low types, and hence the stable bargaining norm
gives a larger part of the surplus to the high types than they would get if the norm had been evolved in a
population of mostly high types. Hence, the stable norm allocates more to the high types than the Nash
bargaining solution would in an environment of high types. Although developed in low investment scenarios,
the stable bargaining norm is adhered to even if in the long run everyone invests, and hence it facilitates the
development of full investment norms.
In summary, whether evolutionary learning facilitates or hinders the development of full investment
depends upon whether investments are substitutes or complements. In the following corollaries we state this
insight formally. We compare the stochastically stable outcome to the notion of a self-enforcing norm under
the Nash bargaining solution:
Corollary 3 Assume that investments are substitutes.









norms for su¢ ciently small .
(b) If c satises
1
2
(SH   SA) < c  1
2   (SH   SA)




is a self-enforcing norm for su¢ ciently small 
but fH;SA=2g is not a self-enforcing norm.
(c) If c satises
1
2   (SH   SA) < c < min(c1; c3);






It follows from this corollary that the Nash bargaining solution x^NL never implies e¢ cient investment in





not a self enforcing norm. As we know from corollary 1, the stable norm does induce e¢ cient investment
if investments are strong substitutes. A much di¤erent picture emerges if investments are complements. It
has been shown in Corollary 2 that the stable norm induces less than e¢ cient investment. The following
corollary sharpens this statement and shows that the stable norm always induces less investment compared
to the self-enforcing norm under the Nash bargaining solution.
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the norm fH; x^NL g is self-enforcing but the stable bargaining norm induces low investment.
Proof. Taking into account 2SA < SH + SL the inequality c4(SA; ) < SH SA2  follows directly for both
branches of c4(SA; ) after collecting terms.
The two corollaries are illustrated in gure 2 where, in addition to the parameter regions with sta-
ble investment norms, we also indicate the parameter regions where fH; x^NL g (below the dashed line) and
fH;SA=2g (below the sparsely dashed line) are self-enforcing.
These results demonstrate that the decrease of the size of the hold-up region under the evolutionary
dynamics compared to the equal split rule in the substitutes case is not a simple implication of the existence
of outside options. Rather, the dynamic interplay between investment and bargaining decisions is responsible
for the increased long run investment in our evolutionary setting18 .
10 Discussion
There is a tension in the literature between the results in mechanism design demonstrating that e¢ cient
allocations can be implemented under a wide variety of situations, and the fact that one rarely observes
many of these mechanisms in practice.19 An example of this tension is the recent contribution of Maskin
and Tirole (1999). They show that one can design an incentive compatible mechanism that achieves the rst
best in the hold-up model of Grossman and Hart (1986). The fact that such a mechanism exists does not
imply that participants in the market will necessarily discover such an e¢ cient solution.
In this paper we address this question directly by studying the evolution of behavior in a market with
learning and two sided relationship specic investments. Our model has multiple perfect equilibria that
include both e¢ cient and ine¢ cient outcomes. We use the evolutionary learning approach of Young (1993a)
and Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) to explore the stability of these equilibria, and nd that in many
cases e¢ cient equilibria are not in fact stable. This result is consistent with the theory of the rm developed
by both Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Grossman and Hart (1986), that emphasize the role that rms
play in arbitrating the conicts that arise when all parties in the organization provide costly inputs.
The examples discussed in Demsetz (1967) (beaver trapping) and Ellickson (1991) (fencing of farm land)
further highlight the economic importance of the distinction between two-sided and one-sided holdup. In
both cases, the authors discuss the creation of property rights in land. Demsetz observes that Native Indians
during colonial times quickly developed claims over the right to trap beavers in specic regions once the fur
trade expanded. This ensured that each group would provide the e¢ cient level of care in maintaining the
resource. Ellickson showed that the obligation to construct and maintain a fence in Shasta county fell to the
person for whom it was cheaper to install and maintain. In both cases, the e¢ cient solution entails having
a single party make all the relationship specic investments. These are examples of the e¢ cient evolution of
18 If we restricted the model to only a single possible investment level the resulting stochastically stable bargaining convention
would exactly match the Nash bargaining solution with the outside option as threat point.
19See Moore (1992) a review of the mechanism design literature, and Tirole (1999) for an evaluation of its relevance for
contract theory.
21
property rights, and are consistent with the results of Troger (2002) and Ellingsen and Robles (2002) who
nd that e¢ cient behavior is stochastically stable in a model with one-sided holdup.
In the one-sided holdup model stability is achieved because the system drifts to a boundary point where
all rents are allocated to one party, and hence o¤ equilibrium beliefs are not important. This is not the case
in the two sided holdup model model. In this case norms evolve only for events that occur with su¢ cient
frequency. This is assured when investment has a stochastic e¤ect on productivity. In this case we nd that
the egalitarian bargaining norm is stable inducing investment incentives below the e¢ cient level.
The standard economic solution to the problem is to increase competition. We nd that this can indeed
reduce the ine¢ ciencies caused by such norms. In cases where investments are substitutes the stable norm
provides even stronger investment incentives compared to the Nash bargaining solution and for strong sub-
stitutes e¢ cient investment levels are induced. However, we also show that if competition is too strong it can
prevent the evolution of norms, which can in turn result in increased ine¢ ciency due to bargaining failures
and conict. This result is consistent with some of the documented problems that have been associated
with the transition from planned to market economics, a question that deserves further research (see Roland
(2000)).
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Appendix A: Description of the Learning Dynamics
Sampling, memory and belief formation:
The memory of an individual consists of the following data:
1. m observations of types of individuals where all these observations stem from t   1. Let p^it 2 P :=
f0; 1=m; 2=m; : : : ; 1g denote the fraction of individuals in this sample with Ti;t 1 = H.
2. m observations of demands made by high and low types in HL matches. Since in general the sample
taken in period t consists of fewer than m HL matches some older observations may remain in the
sample. The oldest data is dropped as new observations are inserted. This sample is used to estimate
the empirical distribution functions F^H(:) and F^L(:). Both of these empirical distribution functions
are elements from the nite set
F = fF : X (k)! f0; 1=m; 2=m; :::; 1g jF (x) is increasing, F (SA) = 1g :
The set of all possible beliefs of an agent is then given by B = P F2.
Expected payo¤s:
The expected payo¤ of an agent with type H or L choosing a 2 X (k) under beliefs b 2 B; is given recursively
by:
UL (a; b) = (1  p^ (b))SL=2 + p^ (b)

F^H (SA   a; b) a+ 






UH (a; b) = p^ (b)SH=2 + (1  p^ (b))

F^L (SA   a; b) a+ 




































Determination of demands in step 2. of the timeline






; given her type T i 2 fL;Hg and beliefs bit 2 B:
When indi¤erent over demands she chooses the smallest demand. The agents strategy is uniquely dened





State space of the process
The state space is given by all possible distributions of n individuals over the set C = fH;Lg B:
S = fs 2 [0; 1]jCjj
X
c2C
sc = 1; nsc 2 IN0 8c 2 Cg;
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
E¢ ciency implies SH   c > SA > 0; therefore if one sets x^L = 0; then conditions 1 and 3 for a self-enforcing
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norm are strictly satised for  = 0. The trade condition implies that SA >  (SL + SH) =2 > SH=2 and
therefore condition 2 is strictly satised. Given that the expressions in the denition of a self-enforcing norm
are continuous for small , these conditions are satised for small : 2
Proof of Lemma 1:
Let s and s0 be two arbitrary states in S. We show that there is a positive multi-step transition probability
from s to s0 and a positive one-step transition probability from s0 to s0. This then implies that the process
is irreducible and aperiodic.
Assume that t = s. With positive probability the bargaining strategy of all agents at time t is such
that all agents carry out the project (some mutations of bargaining strategies might be needed) and leave
the population. Hence, with positive probability in period t+1 the types of all agents in the population are
determined anew and with a positive probability the resulting distribution of types matches exactly the one
in s0. Every period there is positive probability that the distribution of types stays like that. If there are both
high and low types in s0 it is straight-forward to see that any set of observations needed to create empirical
distribution functions which have positive weight in s0 can be created by multiple mutations of bargaining
behavior of the agents given the type distribution. In case there are only high or only low types in s0 consider
the transition where rst all but one agent get the type required in s0, then all the observations needed to
create all the beliefs in s0 are created by mutations and nally the single agent with a di¤erent type leaves
the population and changes her type. In any case there is a positive probability that s0 is reached in multiple
steps. Furthermore, since there is always a positive probability that all agents only observe matches between
the same types during a period and therefore do not change their beliefs, there is a positive probability that
the process stays in s0 once it has reached s0. Hence, the process is irreducible and aperiodic. 2.
Proof of Proposition 3:
We say that a bargaining norm is compatible with p^ and  if both parties are better o¤ than their respective
expected outside option. By waiting for an partner of same type, an agent with beliefs b expects a payo¤
of p^(b)1 (1 p^(b))
SH




2 if she is of type L. Hence, a bargaining norm (xL) is
compatible with p^ and  if xL 2 [xL(p^); xL(p^)], where xL(p^) 2 X(k) such that






and xL(p^) 2 X such that




< xL(p^) + :
Dene
BL() = fxL 2 Xj9p 2 P s.t. xL = xL(p) or 9p 2 P s.t. xL = xL(p)g
BH() = fxH 2 Xj9p 2 P s.t. xH = SA   xL(p)
or 9p 2 P s.t. xH = SA   xL(p)g
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as the set of all demands which lie just above the outside option for some p^ 2 P and the best responses
to that. The larger m is the larger these sets are and for su¢ ciently large m we simply have BH() =
X \ SA   SL2 ; SH2  and BL = X \ SA   SH2 ; SL2 .
To prove our claim we show that for su¢ ciently large m, n and k the unique stochastically stable set of
the process ftg is a set L where for all states s 2 L we have s > 0 only if  = (T; b) for some T 2 fH;Lg
and some b such that supp(F^H(; b)) 2 BH(), supp(F^L(; b)) 2 BL().
Assume t = s for an arbitrary state s 2 S. Assume further that there are at least m low types and at
least m high types in the population (if this is not true, there is a positive probability that at least m low and
high types will be in the population within two periods). Then, there is a positive probability that in period
t+ 1 all low types have beliefs p^i = 0 and at least m are matched with high types. The resulting demands
at t+ 1 of these low types are larger or equal to xL(0). There is a positive probability that at least m high
types observe these m demands in t + 2 and that the same m high types in period t + 3 have beliefs such
that p^(bi) = 1 and are matched with low types. For these individuals we have F^L(; b) = P(xL(0)). Since the
trade condition does not hold, we have xL(0) > xL(1). Accordingly, the outside option is binding for all these
high types and they demand xH = SA   xL(1) in period t+ 3. With positive probability these m demands
are sampled by all agents in t+4 and hence all agents have beliefs such that F^H(; b) = P(SA  xL(1)). With
positive probability these beliefs stay unchanged till t + 5 whereas the belief about the type distribution
changes to p^(b) = 0. With positive probability in t + 5 now at least m low type agents are matched with
high types and since xL(0) > xL(1) their outside option is binding and their demands are xL = xL(0). With
positive probability all agents sample the demands of these m low types in t + 6 and hence all agents have
beliefs b such that (p^(b) = 0; F^H(; b) = P(SA   xL(1)); F^L(; b) = P(xL(0))). We denote this state by ~s.
The fact that there exists a positive multi-step transition probability from every state to ~s implies that the
Markov chain has a single limit set which includes ~s. Obviously, this single limit set consists of all states
which can be reached with positive probability from ~s. Taking into account that every demand of a high
type where the outside option is binding has to be in BH and that the best response of a high type with
some beliefs F^L with support in BL and p^ 2 P must lie in BH as well, shows that all demands of high types
have to be in BH once ~s has been reached. Similarly for a low type. Accordingly, given that  = 0, any
observation outside BH  BL has probability zero once ~s has been reached before. This shows that L is the
only limit set in the state space which implies that this set has to be stochastically stable. Finally, it is easy
to see that with  = 0 there is a positive transition probability from ~s to some state with heterogeneous
demands of agents. This is due to the fact there is always a positive probability that individuals obtain
di¤erent samples of productivity types and that under the beliefs F^L; F^H in ~s the outside option is binding
for any agent with p^ 2 (0; 1). Accordingly the set L has to include states where demands and beliefs about
demands are heterogenous. 2
Proof of Lemma 2:
First, we observe that lim!0 ~~() > 0 can only hold if ~ is an element of a minimal absorbing set (limit
set) for  = 0. Furthermore, in state ~ = 0 (~ = 1) we necessarily have p^ = 0 (p^ = 1) for all individuals.
Accordingly, all individuals make identical investment decisions and for  = 0 one of the following four cases
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has to hold, where we denote by Q() = [qij()]i; j 2 ~S the one-step transition matrix of the Markov process
f~tg:
1. q00(0) = 1; q10(0) = 1
2. q01(0) = 1; q11(0) = 1
3. q00(0) = 1; q11(0) = 1
4. q01(0) = 1; q10(0) = 1
It can also be easily established that qi0 + qi1 > 0 for all i 2 ~S and therefore no state other than  = 0
or  = 1 can be part of a limit set. In cases 1. and 2. f0g respectively f1g are the only limit sets. In case 3
there are two co-existing limit sets, f0g and f1g. Well known results about stochastic stability of equilibria
in coordination games (e.g. Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993)) can be applied to show that generically we
have either lim!0 ~0() = 1 or lim!0 ~1() = 1. Finally, in case 4. the only limit set is f0; 1g. Using










that lim!0 ~0 = lim!0 ~

1 = 0:5. 2
Proof of Proposition 4:
We start with providing a characterization of possible limit sets of ftg in a lemma. Denote the set of all
bargaining norms which are compatible (see the denition in the proof of Proposition 3) with all p^ 2 [0; 1]
for a certain discount factor by C(). We rst show the following lemma, where  = LH = HL is the
minimum unit of account for dividing the surplus, as dened in the game form of section 2.
Lemma 3 a) The set C() is non-empty for su¢ ciently small  if and only if the trade condition holds.
b) Suppose that  is su¢ ciently small and the trade condition holds. Then for each xL 2 C() there exists
a limit set 
(xL) consisting of all s 2 S such that s > 0 only if  = (T; b) for some some T 2 fH;Lg
and some b such that F^H(; b) = P(SA   xL) and F^L(; b) = P(xL).
Proof of the Lemma:
a) Dene xL and xL as in (5) and (6). Considering the monotonicity of these expressions with respect to p^
we get C() = [xL(0); xL(1)]. Simple calculations now establish that C() 6= ; for su¢ ciently small  if and
only if  < 2SASL+SH . This is exactly the trade condition, hence part a) of the Lemma.
b) First we show that all the sets given in b) are limit sets, i.e. we have to show that for  = 0 they are
absorbing and for each pair of states in such a set there is a positive (multi-step) transition probability.
It follows from the denition of C() that if x 2 C() and all individuals have point beliefs b such that
F^L(; b) = P(x); F^H(; b) = P(SA   x), all individuals have the optimal bargaining strategy xL = x; xH =
SA x. Therefore, in the absence of mutations these point beliefs can never be altered and therefore 
(x) is
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absorbing. Furthermore, since in every period every distribution of types has a positive probability regardless
of the actual investment behavior, and so also for every p^ 2 P there is a positive probability that a sample
yielding such an estimator is observed, all possible distributions of types and p^ can be reached with positive
probability. Hence, the set 
(x) is connected, which implies that it is a limit set.
To prove that these are the only limit sets, we show that from every state which is not in one of the
limit sets described above there is a positive probability to reach one of these sets. This comes down to
showing that a homogeneous bargaining norm which is consistent with all p^ 2 P can always be reached with
positive probability. The transition can go as follows: assume t = s for some arbitrary state s 2 S. With
positive probability there are at least m low types in t+1 and with positive probability at t + 2 there is
some pairing of a low type agent aL and a high type agent aH with bids ~xH ; ~xL, where aL has beliefs b such
that p^(b) = 0 and accordingly ~xL  SL2 . With positive probability this pairing is repeated m times from
period t+2 till t+m  1 and one agent, we call him bH , in the population samples all these pairings but no
other high-low pairings. Accordingly, at t+m she has beliefs such that F^L(; bt+m) = P(~xL). Furthermore,
there is a positive probability that the beliefs of aL (or the agent who replaces her) only observes high-high
meetings during this period and her beliefs stay unchanged. Furthermore there is a positive probability
that aL and bH are matched in periods t + m till t + 2m   1. In each such matching the two bids are
~xL of aL and SA   ~xL of bH . Again, there is a positive probability that all individuals sample only these
high/low pairings during periods t + m to t + 2m   1. Then in t + 2m all agents have beliefs such that
F^L(dot; bt+2m) = P(~xL); F^H(; bt+2m) = P(SA   ~xL). If SA   ~xL  SH2 we have ~xL 2 C() and the proof of
(a) is complete.
If SA   ~xL < SH2 , there is a positive probability that in period t + 2m + 2 there is a high type with
p^ = 1. This agent then makes a bid ~~xH such that ~~xH    < SH2  ~~xH and the same arguments as above
imply that there is a positive probability that a homogeneous state will evolve where all agents hold beliefs
b such that F^L(; b) = P(SA   ~~xH); F^H(; b) = P(~~xH). Since  < 2SASH+SL implies SH2 > SA   SL2 , we have
SA   ~~xH 2 C() for su¢ ciently small . 2
We have to determine which of the limit sets characterized in Lemma 3 b) are stochastically stable. We
use the radius modied coradius criterion introduced in Ellison (2000). For a union of limit sets 
 the radius
R(
) is dened as the minimum number of mutations needed to get to a state outside the basin of attraction
of 
 with positive probability. The modied coradius CR(
) is dened as follows: consider an arbitrary
state x 62 
 and a path (z1; z2; : : : ; zT ) from x to 
 where L1; L2; : : : ; Lr  
 is the sequence of limit sets
the path goes through (this implies Lr  
). We dene the modied costs of this path by




where c(z1; : : : ; zT ) gives the number of mutations needed on the path (x1; : : : ; zT ). Denoting by c(x;
)
the minimal modied costs for all paths from x to 








Ellison (2000) proves that every union of limit sets 
 with R(
) < CR(
) contains all stochastically stable
states.
In what follows we calculate the radius and modied coradius of the bargaining norms described in
Lemma 3. In the case of substitutes the limit sets are of the form 
(xL) for xL 2 C(). Let ~xL be an
arbitrary bargaining norm with ~xL 2 C(). To destabilize the norm upwards either a su¢ cient number of
high types have to mutate to a xH smaller than SA   ~xL, in the extreme case xH = 0, such that the best
response of a high type who has sampled all these mutants becomes xL = SA, or a su¢ cient number of low
types have to mutate to xL = ~xL +  such that the best response of a high type who has sampled all these
mutants becomes xH = SA   ~xL   , where  = SAk . As has been demonstrated in Young (1993b), for
su¢ ciently small  the second of these two possibilities yields transitions with a lower number of mutations
(the number goes to zero as  goes to zero). Similar arguments hold for a downwards destabilization and
therefore in order to leave a norm ~xL with the minimal necessary number of mutations either the path to
~xL+ or the path to ~xL  has to be taken. We dene by c+(xL) the minimal number of mutations needed
to get to ~xL+ and by c (xL) the minimal number of mutations needed to get to ~xL . We rst calculate
c+(~xL).
The number of mutations needed to destabilize a norm also depends on the beliefs p^. We rst show that
the minimal number of mutants either occurs at p^ = 0 or at p^ = 1. Consider a low type whose beliefs F^H
attach probability q to xH = SA  ~xL+ and 1  q to xH = SA  ~xL. Denote by v the expected discounted
payo¤ of this individual given that he faces a high type and bids xL = ~xL whenever facing a high type.
Taking into account that he will always trade immediately when he meets another low type we get
v = (1  q)~xL + q






(1  q)~xL + q(1  p^)SL=2
1  qp^ :
Note that this expression is monotonic in p^ for p^ 2 [0; 1] (increasing or decreasing). The minimal number of
mutations needed to destabilize the norm is given by dm~qe, where ~q is the minimal q such that:
v(q; p^) < ~xL   
holds for some p^ 2 [0; 1]. Since the right hand side is constant in q and p^ and the left hand side is monotonous
in p^ for all q the minimal q is either attained at p^ = 0 or at p^ = 1.
With p^ = 0 we get




q > q1 (~xL) :=

~xL    SL2
:





Accordingly, the norm can be destabilized downwards if
q < q2 (~xL) :=

~xL(1  ) +  :
Comparing the two we see that q1 (~xL) < q2 (~xL) if and only if ~xL > SL2 + . All-together we have
c (~xL) =
8<: q1 (~xL); if ~xL 
SL
2 + ;
q2 (~xL); if ~xL < SL2 + :
Similar reasoning for destabilizations upwards shows that for a high type, who is matched with a low
type and who believes that a fraction q of low types demands xL = ~xL + and a fraction 1  q of low types
demands xL = ~xL, has the following expected payo¤ from demanding xH = SA   ~xL:
w(q; 0) = 1 q1 q (SA   ~xL)
w(q; 1) = (1  q)(SA   ~xL) + q SH2 :
This implies
c+(~xL) =
8<: q1+(~xL); if ~xL  SA  
SH
2   ;




(SA   ~xL)(1  ) + 
q2+ =

SA   ~xL    SH2
:
The function c  is decreasing in ~xL whereas c+ is increasing in this variable which implies that they
have a unique intersection. We denote this intersection point by x^L. Clearly at this point min[c ; c+] is
maximized. For
(7)   2(SH   SA)
SH   SL





2(2  ) (SA   SL   2):




2 ; SA   SH2

for small . Hence, there exists a ^^xL 2 C() that maximizes min[c+; c ] over C()
and whose distance from x^L is smaller than . Taking into account Lemma 3 this in particular implies that
there is a limit set corresponding to the bargaining norm ^^xL.
From the arguments above it follows that for every xL 2 C() with xL < ^^xL we have for the radius of
the limit set 
(xL): R(
(xL)) = dmc+(xL)e and for every xL 2 C() with xL > ^^xL we have R(
(xL)) =
dmc (xL)e. From every limit set 
(xL) there is a path to 
(^^xL) along a graph g which connects every limit
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set 
(xL) where xL < ^^xL with 
(xL + ), and every limit set 
(xL) where xL > ^^xL with 







For su¢ ciently large m we have R(
(^^xL)) > R(
(xL)) for all xL 2 C() n f^^xLg and therefore R(
(^^xL)) >
CR(
(^^xL)). Using the radius-modied coradius criterion we can conclude that the limit set corresponding
to ^^xL is stochastically stable. For k ! 1 we have ^^xL ! x^L and get (a). Exactly the same arguments
establish (b), where it has to be taken into account that in this case x^L lies at the intersection of q1  and








Proof of Proposition 5:
























+ (1  p^)(SA   x^L)

:
Taking into account that (SH + SL) =2 SA < 0 this gives the following condition for high investment to be
optimal:
(9) p^  p(x^L;) := SA   x^L   SL=2  c=(1  2)
SA   SH=2  SL=2 :
Taking into account the arguments in the proof of Lemma 2 it follows immediately that an investment norm
is induced if p > 1, a no-investment norm is induced if p < 0, whereas for p 2 (0; 1) a cyclical investment
is induced. Inserting the expression for the stable norm derived in proposition 4 and letting  go to zero
gives the expressions c1; c2 and c3. 2.
Proof of Proposition 6:
The proof of (b) is identical to the proof of part (a) of proposition 4. To proof (a) we again follow the proof
of proposition 4 but observe that for SA < 2 ((2  )SH + SL) we have x^L > SA    SH2 . Therefore the point
which maximizes min[c+; c ] over C() is given by ^^xL where ^^xL  SA  SH2 < ^^xL+. Stochastic stability of
the limit set 
(^^xL) is established analogous to the proof of proposition 4 but here we have ^^xL ! SA    SH2
for k !1. 2
Proof of Proposition 7:
We show that p(x^sL) > 0:5 implies that no-investment is induced. Inserting the expression for x
s
L obtained
in proposition 6 gives the expression for c4. To show that lim!0 ~0 = 1 we can again apply the radius-
modied coradius criterion. For  = 0 there are two limit sets, namely f0g and f1g. In order to invest high an
individual has to sample at least dmpe high types. Therefore the radius of f0g is given by R(f0g) = dmpe.
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On the other hand, the state where the maximal number of mutations is needed to have a positive transition
probability into f0g is the state 1 and therefore we have CR(f0g) = dm mpe. For p > 0:5 this implies
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